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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by misconstruing the
undisputed fact that the boring logs were part of the contract
documents.
2. Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals applying
L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v. County of Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034,
1037 (Utah 1978) to this case despite the fact that the boring logs
were clearly included in the contract documents is in direct
conflict and contradiction of the Supreme Court decisions in Jack
B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 1986) and Thorn
Constr. Co. v. Depart, of Transp., 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) .
3. Whether an owner's liability for a contractor's reliance
upon an affirmative representation contained in the contract
documents that the boring logs were from "a representative area
near the site" can be relieved, as determined by the Court of
Appeals, by the inclusion of a disclaimer statement "The logs of
borings is provided for Contractors' information but is not a
warrant of subsurface conditions."
OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
Judges Bench, Greenwood and Jackson of the Utah Court of
Appeals decided Case No. 900121-CA and filed the Opinion for
publication on September 26, 1991. The decision was split with
Judge Greenwood writing the opinion, Judge Jackson concurring and
Judge Bench dissenting.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its Opinion for Publication
on September 26, 1991. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals by a writ of
certiorari pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-4 (1986).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
No controlling provisions of constitutions, statues,
ordinances or regulations apply to the resolution of this case
except for Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
Section 78-2a-4 of the Utah Code Annotated, neither of which deal
with substantive issues in the case.
STATEMFNT OF THE CASE
The Utah Court of Appeals Background information is inserted
as a good statement of the case except for the factual error
regarding the boring logs which is the subject of this petition
for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals said the boring logs
were not included in the contract documents. It is the undisputed
fact that the boring logs were included in the contract documents.
The Utah Court of Appeals states the case as follows:
Layton Construction Co. (Layton) was the successful
bidder to act as general contractor on a building project
for Thiokol, to be constructed at Thiokol's facility in
Box Elder County, Utah. Layton utilized plans and
specifications provided by Thiokol in preparing its bid.
Layton and Thiokol executed a Purchase Order/Contract
(construction contract) on July 17, 1986, which
incorporated the specifications provided earlier to
Layton. On August 7, 1986 Frontier Foundations, Inc.
(Frontier) executed a subcontract with Layton, whereby
Frontier agreed to perform the portion of the
construction contract reguiring driving interlocked steel
sheet piles approximately forty-nine feet into the earth.
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Frontier based its bid, in part, upon boring logs Thiokol
had included in its bid specifications. The boring logs
were reports of soil sample analyses at various depths.
The bid specifications described the boring logs to
be from"a representative area near the [project] site"
but cautioned that they were "not part of the contract
documents," and were "not a warrant of subsurface
conditions." The bid specifications included a map
indicating a 1400 foot distance between the location of
the soil tested and the project site. The boring logs
accurately indicated there was no gravel or cobble at the
site tested, but Frontier encountered gravel and cobble
at the project site during actual construction. Because
of the unanticipated gravel and cobble, Frontier alleged
it completed its portion of the project at three times
its projected expense and twice the projected time.
Frontier's delay resulted in increased costs for other
subcontractors and for Layton, and consequent increased
costs for the total project.
Frontier sued Layton seeking additional compensation
for extra work performed because of the unanticipated
subsurface conditions. Layton cross-claimed against
Thiokol for Layton's liability to Frontier because of the
unexpected subsurface conditions. Frontier subsequently
settled with Layton and acquired Layton's claim against
Thiokol.
Frontier/Layton filed a joint motion for partial
summary judgment granting recovery of extra expenses on
the basis that Thiokol had misrepresented a material
fact. Thiokol filed a cross motion for summary judgment
dismissing Frontier/Layton's claims for extra
compensation, alleging: (1) there was not affirmative
representation of subsurface conditions at the project
site; and (2) Frontier/Layton unreasonably relied upon
the soil boring logs.
The trial court granted Thiokol's motion for summary
judgment and denied Frontier/Layton's motion for partial
summary judgment.
Utah Court of Appeals Opinion, September 26, 1991, page 2
[Bracketed material original] [Emphasis added]
ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals erred by misconstruing material
undisputed facts. The Court of Appeals at least in part based it's
decision on the erroneous belief that the boring logs were not part
of the contract documents. The language from the opinion which
shows the courts erroneous assumption is as follows:
The bid specifications described the boring logs to be
from a 'representative area near the [project] site' but
cautioned that they were not part of the contract
document. [Bracketed material original] [Emphasis added]
Court of Appeals Opinion, Page 2.; and,
The trial court found that while the boring logs are
presented as being from "a representative area near the
site" specifically identified on the accompanying map,
the disclaimers that the logs were not part of the
contract documents and "not a warrant of subsurface
conditions," specifically limited Layton's use of the
logs.
Court of Appeals Opinion, Page 5. [Emphasis added].
The boring logs were part of the contract documents and in
fact that is what the contract said. Section 02010 of the
Subsurface Investigations specifically provides:
SECTION 02010
SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATIONS
PART I - GENERAL
1.01 DESCRIPTION
A. Soil borings of a representative area
near the building site have been
taken by Chen & Associates, Salt Lake City,
UT.
B. A copy of the boring logs is included.
C. The soils report was obtained only for the
Engineers use in the design and is not a
part of the Contract Documents. The log of
borings is provided for Contractors'
information but is not a warrant of sub
surface conditions.
(See Exhibit A, l.OlfB & C)). R281. [Emphasis added]
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The Court of Appeals confused "boring logs" with "soil
reports. " While it is true that the soil reports were excluded
from the Contract Documents, the boring logs were included in the
Contract Documents and made a part of the bid package that was
given to prospective bidders.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN "BORING LOGS" AND
"SOIL SAMPLES"
The misconception by the Court of Appeals is extremely
important to a correct and just disposition of this case. The
issue of whether the boring logs were or were not included in the
contract documents is important because it determines whether the
Court should apply the holding of L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v.
County of Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1978) or Jack B. Parson
Const. Co. v. State of Utah Department of Transportation, 725 P.2d
614 (Utah 1986) and Thorn Construction Company, Inc^ vs. Utah
Department of Transportation, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979).
In L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v. County of Tooele, 57 5 P.2d
1034, 1037 (Utah 1978) the Supreme Court considered a set of facts
where a contractor had relied on water table information which had
been provided at the contractor's request, but was not part of the
contract documents. In L.A. Young the information provided was
specifically not part of the contract documents and the disclaimer
not only did not warrant the information but banned recovery even
if there were differing site conditions. The pertinent language
from L.A. Young is as follows:
The information concerning the water table was not
included in the plans and specifications but was provided
5
at plaintiff's request. the information concerning the
test was accurate. There was no representation that the
water table would be the same at the time plaintiff
commenced construction. It was pure assumption on the
part of plaintiff the water table would remain constant.
Furthermore, the contract contained a specific disclaimer
as to any information regarding soil or material borings
or test. "The information is not guaranteed and no
claims for extra work or damages will be considered if
it is found during construction that the actual soil or
material conditions vary from those indicated by the
borings."
Id. at 1038 and 1039. [Emphasis Added]
Conversely, in Jack B. Parson Const. Co. v. State of Utah
Department of Transportation, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 1936) and Thorn
Construction Company, Inc. vs. Utah Department of Transportation,
598 P. 2d 365 (Utah 1979) the Supreme Court held in both of those
cases that when an owner provides information which is made part
of the bid package upon which a prospective bidder relies that the
contractor is entitled to reasonably rely on that information and
disclaimers of the information will not save the owner from paying
equitable adjustments if the information later proves to be wrong.
The pertinent language from Parson which is the later case and
which is essentially identical to Thorn is as follows:
A contractor of public works who, acting reasonably, is
misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by
the public authorities as the basis for bids and who, as
a result, submits a bid which is lower than he would have
otherwise made may recover [damages] in a contract action
The Thorn Court then held that if affirmative
representations made are inaccurate, and the inaccuracies
make the plans and specifications misleading, the
contractor can recover damages caused by reasonable
reliance upon them.
Id. at 616. [Bracketed material original]
In addition to the bold, black letter statement of the law
found in Parson above quoted, Justice Zimmerman gave a good
synopsis of public policy why equity favors making owners
responsible for the information they include in their bid documents
and why we should not let owners hide behind disclaimer statements.
That synopsis is as follows:
This Court's refusal in Thorn to permit a genera 1
disclaimer to impose a requirement that a bidder must
investigate the state's specific affirmative
representations to determine their truth has a sound
basis in policy. Permitting a bidder to rely upon
affirmative statements will place responsibility for the
accuracy of bidding information on the party best suited
to determine whether it is misleading - the state. It
also obviates the necessity for bidders to pad their bids
to protect against unexpected costs that may be incurred
as a result of carelessly prepared plans and
specifications. On the other hand, the rule urged upon
us by UDOT can only be expected encourage sloppy work by
those preparing plans and specifications and to increase
the cost of state projects, for no better reason than to
relieve the state's employees of any duty to be accurate
in representing facts known to them.
Id at 617.
B- THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE HOLDINGS OF
L.A. YOUNG AND PARSON AND THORN AS IT RELATES TO CREATING A
CONFLICT WITH PRIOR SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WHETHER AN
OWNER CAN HIDE BEHIND DISCLAIMERS
In L.A. Young the Court was faced with a situation where
information, accurate for when and where it was taken, was provided
to the contractor, not in the bid documents, but rather at the
contractor's request. Also, in the L.A. Young case the disclaimer
had additional language in it not found in the disclaimer in this
case. That additional language is:
[a] nd no claims for extra work or damages will be
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considered if it is found during construction that the
actual soil or material conditions vary from those
indicated by the burrowing.
L.A. Young Sons Constr. Co. v. County of Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034,
1037 (Utah 1978) at 1038 and 1039.
The disclaimer in the Layton/Thiokol contract does not say
that if there is a difference between the boring logs and the
conditions actually found, that the contractor will not be able to
claim additional compensation for extra work or damages. The
disclaimer is totally silent in that regard.
In the case at bar the boring logs were included in the
contract documents. Section 02010 of the Subsurface Investigation
of the Contract Documents above reproduced states at Section 1.01B
says "A copy of the boring logs is included. " (See Exhibit A,
1.01(B & C)). R2 81. [Emphasis added] Subsection 1.01, subsection
C says "The log of borings is provided for the Contractor' s
information but is not a warrant of subsurface conditions." (See
Exhibit A, 1.01(B & C)). R281.
Therefore, the boring logs were clearly included in the
contract documents. That fact has never been disputed by the
parties to this litigation. Also, as stated above, the disclaimer
relied on by Thiokol in this case does not proscribe a claim for
extra work or damages as did the disclaimer in the L.A. Young case.
The holdings in both Parson and Thorn disfavor disclaimers and in
both of those incidences voided them. Except for the public
contract versus private contract distinction, the facts and
holdings in Parson and Thorn are exactly on point with the facts
in this case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals application of L.A.
Young to the uncontradicted facts of this case creates a holding
which is in direct contradiction to the Utah Supreme Court holdings
in Parson and Thorn.
C. CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION
This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah
regarding changed condition disputes in the private versus public
sector. The Utah Court of Appeals' decision was widely split with
Judge Greenwood writing the opinion, Judge Jackson concurring and
Judge Bench dissenting. We believe it is an extremely important
issue facing both contractors and owners in Utah. Accordingly, we
asked to have the Supreme Court decide the case at the time the
appeal was filed. We asked for a clear statement of the law as it
applies to contracts in the private sector. We believe that this
case was wrongly decided in the Court of Appeals and that confusion
over when a contractor is entitled to rely on bid documents
provided by the owner still abounds. We believe that because the
Court of Appeals decision is in direct conflict with the decisions
in Parson and Thorn that the Utah Supreme Court ought to decide
this case.
CONCLUSION
Because the boring logs, not to be confused with the soils
report, unlike the facts of L.A. Young, were part of the contract
documents and were part of the bid package upon which prospective
bidders formulated their bids and because the disclaimer in L.A.
Young was more restrictive and forbade claims for extra work and
damages even if the conditions differed, the holding in L.A. Young
does not apply to this case. Because the boring logs were included
in the contract documents and because the disclaimer in this case
does not specifically bar claims as did the disclaimer in L.A.
Young, the holdings in Parson and Thorn apply to this case.
Therefore, the disclaimer in this case is contractually ineffective
and void as per the holding in Parson and Thorn and as per the
public policy announced by Justice Zimmerman in Parson.
Frontier/Layton assert that the only question that should be
before this Court or any of the courts below is whether
Frontier/Layton reasonably relied on the information provided.
The Utah Court of Appeals never reached that issue.
Frontier/Layton assert that because of the testimony of Julian Liu,
the affidavit of Jim Nordquist, and the testimony of Robert Weyher
that even the question of reasonable reliance has been answered as
a matter of law.
For all of the foregoing, Frontier/Layton respectfully
requests that the Utah Supreme Court grant this petition for writ
of certiorari.
DATED this 28th day of October, 1991.
MADDOX, NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
Robert U./Dahle
10
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of the
foregoing were hand delivered to the following named individuals
at their respective addresses on Warren Patten and Cullen Battle,
Fabian & Clendenin, 215 South State, 12th Floor, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101 and one (1) copy was mailed, postage prepaid, to Lynn
B. Larsen, 10 East South Temple, #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
this 28th day of October, 1991.
11
3LEED
SEP 2 6 1991
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Frontier Foundations, Inc.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Layton Construction Co., Inc.,
\/<£!icv, >' re Court
OPINION ..j^^ri-ct Appeals-
(For Publication)
Case No. 900121-CA
FILED
(September 26, 1991
Defendant and Appellant,
and
Morton-Thiokol Corporation,
Thiokol Chemical Corporation,
Defendants and Appellees,
and
Reliance Insurance Company,
Defendants.
First District, Box Elder County
The Honorable F.L. Gunnell
Attorneys: J. David Nelson, and Robert D. Dahle, Murray, for
Appellant
Warren Patten, W. Cullen Battle, and Diane Banks,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee Morton Thiokol
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Frontier Foundation, Inc. and Layton Construction Co.,
Inc., (collectively Frontier/Layton), appeal from an order of
the trial court which: (1) grants Thiokol Chemical
SEP
2 7 1991
Corporation's (Thiokol) motion for summary judgment dismissing
Frontier/Layton's claims for additional compensation under a
construction contract, and (2) denies Frontier/Layton's motion
for partial summary judgment on such claims. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Layton Construction Co. (Layton) was the successful bidder
to act as general contractor on a building project for Thiokol,
to be constructed at Thiokol's facility in Box Elder County,
Utah. Layton utilized plans and specifications provided by
-Thiokol in preparing its bid. Layton and Thiokol executed a
Purchase Order/Contract (construction contract) on July 17,
1986, which incorporated the specifications provided earlier to
Layton. On August 7, 1986 Frontier Foundation, Inc. (Frontier)
executed a subcontract with Layton, whereby Frontier agreed to
perform the portion of the construction contract requiring
driving interlocked steel sheet piles approximately forty-nine
feet into the earth. Frontier based its bid, in part, upon
boring logs Thiokol had included in its bid specifications.
The boring logs were reports of soil sample analyses at various
depths.
The bid specifications described the boring logs to be
from "a representative area near the [project] site" but
cautioned that they were "not part of the contract documents,"
and were "not a warrant of subsurface conditions." The bid
specifications included a map indicating a 1400 foot distance
between the location of the soil tested and the project site.
The boring logs accurately indicated there was no gravel or
cobble at the site tested, but Frontier encountered gravel and
cobble at the project site during actual construction. Because
of the unanticipated gravel and cobble, Frontier alleged it
completed its portion of the project at three times its
projected expense and twice the projected time. Frontier's
delay resulted in increased costs for other subcontractors and
for Layton, and consequent increased costs for the total
project.
Frontier sued Layton seeking additional compensation for
extra work performed because of the unanticipated subsurface
conditions. Layton cross-claimed against Thiokol
1. The parties stipulated that Frontier/Layton's defamation
claim was resolved before the trial court and that the judgment
on appeal is a final appealable judgment under Utah R. App. P.
3.
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for Layton's liability to Frontier because of the unexpected
subsurface conditions. Frontier subsequently settled with
Layton and acquired Layton's claims against Thiokol.
Frontier/Layton filed a joint motion for partial summary
judgment granting recovery of extra expenses on the basis that
Thiokol had misrepresented a material fact. Thiokol filed a
cross motion for summary judgment dismissing Frontier/Layton's
claims for extra compensation, alleging: (1) there was no
affirmative representation of subsurface conditions at the
project site; and (2) Frontier/Layton unreasonably relied upon
the soil boring logs.
The trial court granted Thiokol's motion for summary
judgment and denied Frontier/Layton's motion for partial
summary judgment.
ISSUES
Frontier/Layton contends the trial court erred in denying
its motion for partial summary judgment because it was entitled
to rely on the boring logs as indicating the general quality of
soil to be encountered at the project site since the boring
logs were presented as being from "a representative area near
the site." Thiokol contends, to the contrary, that its
disclaimer and map showing the source of the boring log samples
precluded Frontier/Layton from justifiably relying on the
boring logs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if . . . there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and [if] the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. civ. p~
56(c). On appeal of a summary judgment, we view the facts and
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v.
State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). On review of a trial
court's interpretation of a contract, we note that "[w]hether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law." Village Inn
Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.. 790 P.2d 581,
582 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983)). Further, "[i]f a contract is
determined to be unambiguous, its interpretation is also a
question of law." Village Inn. 790 P.2d at 582. We accord no
deference on appeal on questions of law, but review for
correctness. Christenson v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 71 (Utah App.
1991).
900121-CA
ANALYSIS
We first consider whether the trial court correctly
construed the construction contract.
In interpreting a contract, we
determine what the parties intended by
examining the entire contract and all of
its parts in relation to each other,
giving an objective and reasonable
construction to the contract as a whole.
The cardinal rule is to give effect to the
intentions of the parties and, if
possible, to glean those intentions from
the contract itself. Additionally, a
contract should be interpreted so as to
harmonize all of its terms and provisions,
and all of its term should be given effect
if possible.
G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis. 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1989)
(citations omitted). The specifications incorporated into the
construction contract include the following provisions:
900121-CA
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
1.11 SITE INSPECTION
The contractor shall make every effort to
familiarize himself with the prevailing
work conditions. Any failure by the
contractor to do so shall not relieve him
from the responsibility of performing the
work without additional cost to Morton
Thiokol.
SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS
1.01 DESCRIPTION
A. Soil borings of the representative
area near the building site have been
taken by Chen and Associates, Salt Lake
City, Utah.
B. A copy of the boring logs is included
C. The soil report was obtained only for
the engineer's use in the design and is
not a part of the contract documents. The
log of borings is provided for
contractor's information but is not a
warrant of subsurface conditions.
The trial court found that while the boring logs are
presented as being from "a representative area near the site"
specifically identified on the accompanying map, the
disclaimers that the logs were not part of the contract
documents and "not a warrant of subsurface conditions,"
specifically limited Layton's use of the logs. The contract,
viewed as a whole and giving effect to all its provisions,
presents no ambiguity. There is no dispute that the
information is accurate; nor is there any suggestion that
Thiokol had other information regarding subsurface conditions
at the project site. Layton contends only that Thiokol's
inclusion of the boring logs in the contract documents
justifies Layton's reliance upon them. Any such reliance does
not take into account the disclaimer language, thus failing to
give meaning to and harmonize all of the contractual provisions
In most instances, parties are bound by the terms of their
contract, which defines their relationship and their respective
rights and obligations. Layton contracted to perform the
construction project for the stated price. "[I]f one agrees to
do a thing possible of performance 'he will not be excused or
become entitled to additional compensation, because unforeseen
difficulties are encountered.'" Wunderlich v. State of
California, 65 Cal. 2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473, 423 P.2d 545,
548 (1967) (quoting United States v. Spearin. 248 U.S. 132,
136, 39 S. Ct. 59 (1918) (cited with approval in L.A. Young
Sons Constr. Co. v. County of Tooele. 575 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah
1978). Layton is precluded by the contract from receiving
extra compensation for expenses caused by soil conditions
differing from those in the drill logs provided prior to
bidding.
Layton argues further, however, that interpretation of
this contract should be controlled by the Utah Supreme Court
holdings in Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. Stater 725 P.2d 614
(Utah 1986) and Thorn Constr. Co. v. Dept. of Transp.. 598 P.2d
365 (Utah 1979). In Parson, the Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT) included outdated and misleading
information in its bid specifications, while having more recent
and accurate information in its possession which was contrary
900121-CA
to the information provided prospective bidders. The contract
included a general disclaimer. The court followed the
reasoning in Thorn. and held that a general disclaimer could
not operate to require a bidder to investigate the truthfulness
of specific affirmative representations. Parson, 725 P.2d at
617. Similarly, Thorn involved UDOT's inaccurate positive
representation that certain construction materials were
acceptable. Thorn distinguished its facts and decision from
cases where there were no misrepresentations, accurate
information was provided, and specific disclaimers were
included. Thorn. 598 P.2d at 369 (citing Wunderlich 423 P.2d
at 549; L.A. Young. 575 P.2d at 1034). Layton claims no such
inaccurate representations or that Thiokol possessed better or
contrary information. Indeed, the boring logs were accurate as
to the area from which they were taken, the area was explicitly
identified, and Layton was cautioned not to rely on the logs.
Because there were no positive misrepresentations and there was
a specific disclaimer, Parson and Thorn are inapplicable.2
In sum, the trial court correctly determined that the
construction contract, read as a whole, unambiguously provides
that Layton could not rely on the boring logs as representing
the soil to be encountered at the construction site and,
therefore Layton is not entitled to damages incurred because of
differing soil conditions. We therefore affirm the trial
court's grant of Thiokol's motion for summary judgment
dismissing Frontier/Layton's claims for additional compensation
and denying Frontier/Layton's motion for partial summary
judgment on such claims. Since we hold the contract precludes
2. In addition, this is a dispute involving a private
contract, while Parson and Thorn involve public contract issues
and policy considerations.
900121-CA
reliance on the boring logs, we do not reach the issue of
reasonable reliance.
Pamela T. Greenwood*, Judge
I CONCUR:
C- 1— \#
Norman H. Jackson,kludge
I DISSENT:
Russell W. Bench, Presidrhg Jutdge
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No. 870020506
This matter came before the Court on Morton Thiokol's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Layton Construction Company and Frontier
Foundation Company's Cross-motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The
issue presented before the Court in both Motions is the
applicability and application of the differing site conditions
clause of the contract presented before the Court in this
litigation. The Court having reviewed the extensive pleadings on
file in this case as well as the Motions and supporting affidavits
and material presented therewith now enters the following Memorandum
Decision.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
As a threshold inquiry the Court is faced with the
determination with the novel question of determining the applicable
0008m
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law that applies to this situation. The Court is of the opinion
that although the Utah cases cited are cases involving Public Works
Contracts, they are of value as precedent in this fact situation and
the public contract/private contract distinction is of no legal
import. Accordingly, the Court has applied the doctrines and
principles established in the Thorn Construction Company and
subsequent Jack B. Parson Construction Company cases cited in the
material presented to the Court.
These cases established a three-prong test for determining
the applicability of a differing site conditions provision. The
criteria established by the cases is:
1. Affirmative representations made.
2. The representations are inaccurate.
3. The inaccuracies make the plans and specifications
misleading.
4. Reliance there upon is reasonable.
Applying this analysis to the present case, the Court notes that the
plans and specifications did include a representation that soil
borings of a representative area near the building site have been
taken by Chen and Associates. It is conceded by all parties that a
copy of the boring logs was included which showed the exact location
of the boring site which was over 1000 feet away from the site in
question. The next provision of the contract Subsection C of Part I
as it relates to subsurface investigations indicates that, "The
soils report was obtained only for the Engineers use in the design
and is not a part of the contract documents. The log of borings is
provided for contractors information but is not a warrant of
subsurface conditions.**
Essentially Plaintiff's position is that the providing of the
soil borings logs and the map's and accompanying documents was in
effect a warranty of the site conditions being the same, despite the
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acknowledgment of all parties that it was in a distant location and
despite the express disclaimer above quoted.
A review of all the material submitted to the Court satisfies
the Court first; that there are two basis for Granting Thiokol's
Motion for Summary Judgment:
1. Even if the provisions of the contract are considered
to indicate that the soil boring presented is a
"•representative" area, there is a specific
disclaimer indicating the use to which that
information is to be put. This in the mind of the Court
is not a general disclaimer which would be invalid as
against a specific representation, but is a specific
disclaimer relating to the specific clause in question.
2. A second basis for Granting Defendant Thiokol's Motion
for Summary judgment is that there must be a reasonable
reliance by the contractor upon the information presented
to the contractor by Thiokol and that the representations
must be affirmative and inaccurate and that the
inaccuracies are misleading.
The Court cannot find in the review of the documents,
material and matters presented that there is anything misleading
about the information presented. It was clearly identified as to
where the soil borings were taken, there was no affirmative
representation that the conditions would be the same in either
location as contrasted with the facts presented in both the Thorn
case and in the Jack Parson case, where there was information
available but not disclosed or oral representations made which were
inaccurate. In this case all of the information that was available
was presented and the contractor would now have the Court say that
since Thiokol presented the information they are bound by it even
though the information presented was presented in its totality
indicating that it was not in the same area, was at a distant
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location and even though there was a specific disclaimer as to the
purpose for which the information was presented. In this case
Plaintiff's position would be to say if Thiokol withheld information
then they certainly fall within the perimeters of the Parson & Thorn
case as to misleading the contractor and if they present all
information they in effect warrant that the same will be true in all
settings. The Court finds that as a matter of public policy this is
an untenable position.
The Court also notes that there are strong public policy
arguments both directions all of which have been presented by the
parties. Certainly there is a strong argument that Thiokol should
pay for the work that was done. On the other hand, there is a
purpose for a bidding procedure and a contractor should take
reasonable steps prior to submitting a bid to ascertain that in fact
he will be able to perform on the bid. This Court has no
information to ascertain but what other bidders who were not low in
this case, did in fact undertake a more thorough investigation of
the conditions and did take reasonable steps to ascertain whether or
not the conditions on the two locations would be in fact the same
and as a result of these investigations submitted higher bids which
resulted in their not being awarded the contract. It seems to the
Court that there are very strong equitable arguments on both sides
which leaves the Court a factual question as to the application of
the law to this situation.
For the foregoing reasons the Court Grants Thiokol's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Denies the remaining Partial Summary
Judgment Motions and directs Counsel for Thiokol to prepare an order
in conformance with this opinion. ,
DATED this (p day of October, 1989.
iC* ^•y.%..«^Jl-
F.L. Gunnell
District Judge
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SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATIONS
PART 1 - GENERAL
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